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Coercive Pressures and Anti-Corruption Reporting:  
 The Case of ASEAN Countries  
 
Abstract  
This paper aims to investigate the extent of anti-corruption reporting by ASEAN 
companies and examine whether coercive factors influence the level of disclosure. The 
authors adopt indicators from the Global Reporting Initiative version 4.0 to measure the 
extent of anti-corruption disclosures in 117 companies’ annual reports. Informed by a 
coercive isomorphism tenet drawn from the institutional theory, the authors propose that 
several institutional factors influence the extent of their voluntary disclosures. The 
findings reveal that a large degree of variability difference between the average levels of 
anti-corruption disclosure in Thailand (434 words) and the Philippines (149 words). The 
dependence on government tenders and foreign ownership are associated with the level of 
disclosure. Surprisingly, the United Nation Global Compact membership is not a 
significant determinant of anti-corruption reporting. This signifies that the membership in 
the international initiative does not correspond to individual company’s commitment to 
disclose anti-corruption information. In spite of significant efforts undertaken by global 
organizations to combat corruption, the level of anti-corruption disclosure is significantly 
different among the four countries under study. The disclosure of sensitive information 
such as the confirmed incidences of corruption cases requires careful consideration by the 
top management as it is subjected to legal implications and reputational risks. Thus, 
impression management can complement the coercive pressure in explaining the level of 
anti-corruption reporting. This study is among the first studies which explores the 
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1. Introduction 
The definition and scope of corporate social responsibility (CSR) nowadays has been 
shifted and developed from its traditional definition (Joseph et al., 2016). Traditionally, 
CSR only focuses on environmental protection, labour health and safety, local 
communities, and also aspects in relation to consumers. As aspects of anti-corruptions 
were included in the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) reporting guideline in 2002  and in 
the 10th principle of United Nations Global Compact 1(UNGC) in 2004, corruption then 
became an integral part of CSR Issues (Branco and Matos, 2016). While corruption  
issues have been integrated to CSR for more than one decade, research shows that, 
generally, anti-corruption disclosure practices across the globe is still underdeveloped 
(see Branco and Matos, 2016; Joseph et al., 2016; Islam et al., 2017), particularly if they 
are compared to other CSR aspect disclosure practices (Adeyeye, 2012).  
Corruption has hazardous impacts and negative consequences to society 
(Barkemeyer et al., 2015). Corruption is known as one of social diseases that became the 
main problem in many countries (Zhang et al., 2016). In the public sector, corruption 
diverts resources from essential services such education and health care into the corrupt 
government officials (Hills et al., 2009). In the private sector, corruption “inhibits free 
markets and undermines the stability vital to succesful economies” while also enabling 
the flow of huge amounts of illegal money to certain corrupt people (Kowalczyk-Hoyer, 
2012, p. 4). Corruption thus acts like sand in the wheels, causing inefficiency in 
companies’ operations (Hanoteau and Vial, 2014). In other words, corruption can 
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increase costs and uncertainty in firms’ activities. Wei (2000) argues that corruption is 
like an additional (but illicit) tax  to a company which, of course, will reduce the 
company’s investments and, consequently, will reduce the firm’s productivity. Such 
reduced investment may include decisions to decline new technology investments, and 
efficient resource allocations efficiently (Hess, 2009).  
Actually, corporate transparency can be deemed as the first line strategy to combat 
corporate corruption (Errath et al., 2005). Trough extensive disclosures, for instance, a 
company is able to communicate their values and policies, including the company’s 
policies regarding anti-corruption, and how they are translated into actions  
(Transparency International, 2014). Disclosures which are formalized in a shape of public 
reporting and linked to the accountability chain help companies to gain legitimacy as the 
public and other stakeholders are informed about the companies’ commitment and real 
actions and they then continuously support companies’ operations and efforts to fight 
against corruption (United Nations Global Compact, 2015).  Such a support presents 
because of the public trust which has been built by extensive corporate disclosures (Hess 
and Dunfee, 2000). This phenomenon is supported by a study conducted by 
PricewaterhouseCooper International (2008) which shows that the presence of the anti-
corruption program and the disclosures of that program are very valuable companies’ 
image. 
In addition to the above, a study by Kimbro (2002) reveals that more transparent 
reporting signals lower corruption. It is documented in the literature that corruption in 
developing countries is much more severe than corruption in developed countries (Shan 
et al., 2015; Adeyeye, 2012; d'Agostino et al., 2016; Brusca et al., 2018). The main 
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problem that demotivates anti-corruption action in developing and transitional countries 
mainly comes from the weak accountability, the poor development of the legal 
institution, the frequent violations of law, regulations, and principles, as well as the 
restriction of civil freedom and healthy political competitions (Myint, 2000; Shan et al., 
2015). Therefore, anti-corruption strategies should be mainly (and perhaps much 
strongerly) developed in these countries.  
A similar situation happens in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) member countries. The majority of ASEAN member countries are emerging 
nations and are ranked in the bottom half of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
developed by Transparency International, a well-known international anti-corruption, non 
government organization based in Gernmany (Livingasean, 2017; Krongkaew, 2015). 
This means that most ASEAN countries are the world’s most corrupt nations (Rao-
Nicholson et al., 2016). This is ironic given that ASEAN member countries have had a 
formal agreement and commitment through a signed Memorandum of Understandig 
(MoU) to fight against corruption since 2004 (Jiangyu, 2012). The corruption 
phenomenon in the ASEAN region also contradicts the spirit of the current economic 
regional integration among ASEAN member countries, which is termed as ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC), in which there are free movements of goods, services, 
investment, free flow of capital, and skilled labour within ASEAN region for creating a 
more competitive business environment within the region and improving the economy of 
ASEAN member countries (ASEAN, 2008; 2013).  
As companies are expected to contribute to the collective actions against 
corruption and contribute to implementation of AEC (ASEAN, 2013; United Nations 
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Global Compact, 2015), there are potential pressures from various powerful stakeholder 
groups such as the governments of ASEAN member countries which press companies to 
transparently communicate their commitments, policies, and actions regarding anti-
corruption efforts. To gain legitimacy and to be sustainable, companies operating in the 
ASEAN region needs to respond to those pressures. It is therefore considered important 
in this paper to examine anti-corruption disclosure practices in the ASEAN region and 
possible powerful stakeholders’ pressures which press companies operating in that region 
to transparently communicate anti-corruption information. 
This study brings at least two major contributions to the literature. Firstly, this 
study examines anti-corruption disclosures, a specific subset of CSR reporting which has 
gained growing attention in the social accounting literature recently (see for example 
Blanc et al., 2017; Islam et al., 2017) but the number of published papers on this specific 
disclosure practices is still considered small (Issa and Alleyne, 2018). The growing 
interest in anti-corruption reporting highlights the importance of this CSR subset in the 
accounting arena. Anti-corruption disclosure itself reflects the role of accounting in 
combating corruption. Secondly, this study examines anti-corruption disclosure practices 
in the ASEAN region, one of the most corrupt regions in the world based on 
Transparency International’s report (Transparency International, 2016).  To date, most 
studies on accounting practices in the ASEAN region focus on general financial 
accounting practices (e.g. Marzuki and Wahab, 2018) and a whole set of CSR disclosures 
(Arena et al., 2018). A study on anti-corruption reporting in the ASEAN region has 
actually been done by Joseph et al. (2016) but it focuses only on two countries, which are 
Indonesia and Malaysia. Moreover, Joseph et al. (2016)’s study does not investigate the 
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potential factors explaining the disclosure practices. The current paper offers more 
comprehensive insights by investigating anti-corruption reporting in four ASEAN 
member countries (Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar, Philippines) and the possible 
determinants of that reporting using the coercive isomorphism tenet.  
 
2. Literature review and theoretical framework 
To date, there has been a thin but growing literature about anti-corruption disclosure 
practices as an intergral part of CSR reporting. These studies have looked at anti-
corruption disclosure practices across geographic jurisdictions. Some studies focus on 
disclosure practices in one country and some other studies look at disclosure practices in 
multiple countries. Past studies examining anti-corruption disclosure practices in one 
specific nation include Islam et al. (2015), Branco and Matos (2016), D’onza et al. 
(2017), and Islam et al. (2017). Islam et al. (2015) examine anti-bribery reporting 
practices, a subset of anti-corruption disclosure, of two Chinese telecommunication 
companies. Branco and Matos (2016) investigate anti-corruption disclosure practices of 
39 Poruguese firms. D’onza et al. (2017) examine the characteristic of anti-corruption 
disclosures of 120 Italian local governments. Islam et al. (2017) analyze anti-corruption 
disclosures of 20 largest Australian overseas aid not-for-profit organizations. There is a 
study by Gunawan and Joseph (2017) in Indonesia but is focuses on the activities of anti-
corruption, not reporting. In Gunawan and Joseph (2017)’s study, a focus group with 
respondents representing 10 Indonesian CSR best practice companies was undertaken to 
exlpore these companies’ anti-corruption practices. 
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Prior studies examining anti-corruption reporting in multiple countries include 
Barkemeyer et al. (2015), Healy and Serafeim (2016), Joseph et al. (2016), Blanc et al. 
(2017), Issa and Alleyne (2018) and Islam et al. (2018). Barkemeyer et al. (2015) 
examine anti-corruption dislclosures in 933 Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) corporate 
sustainability reports from 30 countries. Among these countries, there is only one 
ASEAN member country, which is the Philippines. Helay and Serafeim (2015) analyze 
whether 480 companies’ anti-corruption disclosure from 32 countries reflect companies’ 
real efforts to combat corruption. Among the country origins of the sample companies, 
there are three ASEAN member countries, which are Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia. 
Joseph et al. (2016) examines the level of anti-corruption disclosure in annual reports of  
24 Malaysian and 34 Indonesian CSR best practice companies. Malaysia and Indonesia 
are ASEAN member countries. Blanc et al. (2017) investigate anti-corruption disclosure 
by 105 biggest multinational companies whose headquarters are located in 23 different 
nations. None of these nations, however, is an ASEAN member country. Issa and Alleyne 
(2018) determine the level of anti-corruption disclosure in the sustainability reports of 66 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) companies in Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, 
UAE, and Qatar. Again, none of these countries is an ASEAN member nation. Islam et 
al. (2018) also examine disclosure practices outside the ASEAN region as they focus 
their research on anti-bribery disclosure practices of two European-based global 
telecommunication companies (French-based Alcatel-Lucent and German-based Siemens 
AG). It can be noted from the outline of these past studies that, while there are several 
multiple country studies which include several ASEAN member countries in their 
examinations, there are no past studies which exclusively analyze ASEAN companies.  
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In terms of research methods used, prior anti-corruption disclosure studies can be 
classified into two main types of analyses - descriptive studies which generally show low 
disclosure levels (Joseph et al., 2016; Islam et al., 2017; Issa and Alleyne, 2018) and 
examinations of factors explaining the variability of disclosures (Barkemeyer et al., 2015; 
Islam et al., 2015; Branco and Matos, 2016; Healy and Serafeim, 2016; Blanc et al., 
2017; D’onza et al., 2017; Islam et al., 2018). Interestingly, most of the descriptive-based 
studies use coercive isomorphism (Joseph et al., 2016; Issa and Alleyne, 2018) whereas 
most of the inferential-based studies employ legitimacy theory, either as a specifically 
individual framework (Branco and Matos, 2016; Blanc et al., 2017) or as a joint 
framework with other theories such as agency theory (D’onza et al., 2017) and media 
agenda setting theory (Islam et al., 2018). In fact, it is recommended in the literature that 
regulators’ pressures on companies to disclose anti-corruption actions need to be 
examined. (see D’onza et al., 2017). Arguably, such an examination can only be 
undertaken under the umbrella of coercive isomorphism, a specific subset of institutional 
theory. This is because this specific tenet reflects pressures from powerful stakeholder 
groups, including regulators (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Cahaya et al., 2015; Martínez-
Ferrero and García-Sánchez, 2017). To fill the existing literature gaps, this paper 
exlcusively examine anti-corruption reporting practices in the ASEAN region, one of the 
most corrupt regions in the world (Rao-Nicholson et al., 2016), by looking at both the 
extent and the determinants of the variability of that extent within the framework of 
coervice isomorphism so that potential pressures from powerful stakeholder groups, 
including regulators, can be captured. 
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Institutional theory explains a situation in which an organization is insitutionally 
pressed to undertake particular activities, including anti-corruption disclosure practices 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Deegan and Unerman, 2011; Issa and Alleyne, 2018). 
Institutional theory is considered suitable for this study because it provides the 
complementary perspectives of stakeholder and legitimacy theory regarding voluntary 
disclosures (Deegan and Unerman, 2011; Deegan, 2014). As stated by Deegan and 
Unerman (2011) the similariy between institutional theory and legitimacy theory relies on 
the understanding how an organization adapts as a response to social and institutional 
pressures to meet social norms and values. Institutional theory itself is a branch of 
legitimacy theory (Perera, 2007; Cahaya et al., 2016; Cahaya et al., 2017). The similarity 
between institutional theory and stakeholder theory, on the other hand, relies on the 
managerial branch of stakeholder theory which explains that an organization uses 
voluntary disclosures to address economic and ethical values and concerns of influential 
stakeholders to whom the organization depend on (Deegan and Unerman, 2011). Due to 
such a comprehensive explanation, institutional theory is considered capable to to provide 
a richer analysis for a CSR accounting study (see Deegan, 2017).  
Institutional theory has two branches – decoupling and isomorphism (Amran and 
Haniffa, 2011; Deegan, 2017). Decoupling explains a situation in which an organization’s 
actual practices differ from its disclosures (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Isomorphism, 
which is more popular in CSR accounting research, explains a situatin in which an 
organization is institutionally pressed by three ismorphic forces, which are coercive, 
mimetic, and normative pressures, to undertake particular practices such as disclosure 
practices (Dillard et al., 2004). Coercive isomorphism reflects pressures from influential 
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stakeholders and thus this tenet is the one which is considered similar to managerial 
stakeholder theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Deegan, 2014). Mimetic isomorphism 
reflects a situation in which an organization copies other organizations’ practices which 
usually operate in the same industry (Gray et al., 2010). Normative isomorphism reflects 
pressures from groups of norms (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). As explained previously 
in this section, coervice isomorphism is the institutional theory subset which is chosen to 
be employed as the underlying theoretical framework of the current study.  
Coercive isomorphism is the most widely employed subset of institutional theory 
in CSR accounting research (see for example Othman et al., 2011; Joseph et al., 2014; 
Cahaya et al., 2015; Cahaya et al., 2016; Joseph et al., 2016; Issa and Alleyne, 2018; 
Joseph et al., 2019). Coercive isomorphism involves formal and informal pressures 
exerted by other organizations which a particular organizations is dependent on 
(Martínez-Ferrero and García-Sánchez, 2017). More specifically, as explained by Amran 
and Haniffa (2011), the form of coercive pressures can include persuasions or invitations 
to join specific initiatives, political influences, enforced law, and also public pressure at 
large. Powerful institutions possibly press an organization to adopt specific practices can 
include customers, suppliers, competitors, governments, certifications body, and 
politically powerful stakeholders such as political parties (Deegan and Unerman, 2011). 
When there are pressures from these stakeholder groups, an organization needs to 
respond to gain legitimacy  (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Wijethilake et al., 2017). 
Through such legitimacy, the organization’s operations can be sustailanble. 
While coercive isomorphism is similar to managerial stakeholder theory in terms 
of key-stakeholder focused management, there is a main difference between the two 
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theories. Within the framework of coercive isomorphism, an organization discloses 
information as a response to pressures from influential stakeholders whereas, within the 
framework of managerial stakeholder theory, an organization actively identifies who their 
influential stakeholders are, what these stakeholders’ expect companies to perform and 
disclose, and finally the organization attempts to perform the activities demanded by the 
influential stakeholders and discloses those activities (Deegan, 2014). To respond to prior 
researchers’ recommendation to examine regulators’ pressures on companies to 
communicate their anti-corruption actions (see D’onza et al., 2017), coervice 
isomorphism is considered more appropiate to be adopted in this study than managerial 
stakeholder theory. This is because regulators tend to reflect pressures through law 
enforcement or official campaigns (see DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). With or without a 
stakeholder indentification process, regulators are clearly powerful and influential to 
organizations. To further contribute to the existing literature, this study examines not only 
pressures from regulators but also pressures form other possible coercive sources. The 
explanation for the possible impacts of these examined coervice pressures on anti-
corruption reporting is presented in the following hyptoheses develpoment section. 
 
3. Hypotheses development 
This paper examines five key coervice variables potentially influencing the extent of anti-
corruption disclosure in the ASEAN region. These variables are government ownership, 
dependence on government tenders, foreign ownership, international operations, and the 
United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) membership. The following hypotheses 
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development explains the logical associations between the five variables and the extent of 
anti-corruption reporting through the lens of coercive isomorphism. 
 
3.1 Government ownership  
Governments of ASEAN member countries actually have commitments to combat 
corruption and articulate these commitment in their countries’ regulations although, in 
fact, corruption occurs frequently in this region. In Indonesia, for instance, there are a lot 
of regulations to prevent and combat corruption (Gunawan and Joseph, 2017). In this 
regulated condition, the governments potentially push companies to obey anti-corruption 
regulations and disclose their anti-corruption ations. Such a coercive pressure is 
particulary doable to entities whose capital stock structures are dominated by 
governments’ shares. Government-owned companies themselves tend to be politically 
sensitive because their activities are more visible in front of the public eyes and there is a 
higher expectation for such firms to be conscious of their public duties (Muttakin and 
Subramaniam, 2015), in line with the coercive isomorphism tenet. A positively 
significant association between government ownership and the extent of CSR-related 
disclosures is well documented in the literature (e.g. Amran and Devi, 2008; Othman et 
al., 2011; Cahaya et al., 2012; Muttakin and Subramaniam, 2015; Branco and Matos, 
2016). As such, this study proposes the following directional hypothesis: 
   
H1. There is a positive relationship between government ownership and the extent 
of anti-corruption disclosure 
. 
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3. 2 Dependence on government tenders  
A company’s dependence on government tenders reflects that the company’s revenue is 
mostly from the government through projects (Amran and Devi, 2008). A tender 
phenomenon is usual for a government agency as it may not have sufficient internal 
resources to provide public services or build public facilities and therefore it outsource 
some projects to the pivate sector through tenders. It is not easy to win the tender as a 
company must compete with other companies which offer competitive prices and various 
qualities of product or services. A company’s reputation may also be used as a basis for a 
government agency to decide the company which will win the tender. When the 
government is considered as a signicant purchaser through a tender, a company needs to 
maintain a good relationship with it by meeting the government’s demands and 
expectations (Amran and Haniffa, 2011). This company is therefore potentially 
institutionalized by the government’s aspirations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In such a 
situation, the government definitely has a coervice power to press the company to 
undertake particular practices, including anti-corruption disclosure practices, as it may 
have anti-corruption agenda. If the company does not respond to this coercive pressure, 
its future project engagement with the government may be terminated (Amran and 
Haniffa, 2011; Deegan and Unerman, 2011). A positive association between companies’ 
dependence on government tenders and CSR disclosure practices is found in Amran and 
Devi (2008) and Amran and Haniffa (2011). Accordingly, the following directional 
hypothesis is predicted:  
H2. There is a positive relationship between dependence on government tenders 
and the extent of anti-corruption disclosure 
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3.3 Foreign Ownership  
Foreign ownership usually reflects srong influences on foreign business practices and a 
broader separation of ownership as well as management due to geographic distance 
between a company and its shareholders (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Oh et al., 2011; Jeon 
et al., 2011; Muttakin and Subramaniam, 2015). According to Haniffa and Cooke (2005), 
foreign shareholders tend to demand a high level of corporate disclosures because of the 
geographical separation. A foreign shareholder who usually comes from a developed 
country is likely to be more concerned with the company’s global accountability, 
particulary how the company attempts to meet the global community’s expectations in 
relation to sustainable business practices, including anti-corruption practices and 
reporting. This is where foreign shareholders’ coercive pressure can come into play. 
Foreign shareholders can push companies to report anti-corruption activities and, by 
responding to this pressure, the companies may obtain continuous supports and 
legitimacy from this stakeholder group through capital inflows (see DiMaggio and Powel, 
1983; Deegan and Unerman, 2011). A positive association between foreign ownership 
and disclosure practices is documented in some prior studies (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; 
Khan et al., 2013; Muttakin and Subramaniam, 2015). A directional hypothesis is 
therefore proposed as follows: 




3. 4 International operations 
Companies may have business dealings with foreign stakeholders in today’s global 
business enivornment, particulary when they operate internationally (see Appiah-Adu et 
al., 2016). When a company does have such an operation, coercive pressures from 
international stakeholders such as international regulations potentially present. (see 
Epstein and Buhovac, 2014). An overseas branch office, for example, undertakes anti-
corruption practices to comply with the regulations in the nation in which it operates. 
This CSR practice is potentially disclosed by the company through, for instance, an 
integrated reporting system to show its responses to the global coervice pressures 
regarding anti-corrpution programs so that penalties can be avoided (see Cahaya et al., 
2017). Importantly, as a result of this diclosure, the company can gain its legitimacy to 
better survive in an international arena (Higgins and Larrinaga, 2014). In the literature, it 
is frequently documented that companies operating internationally disclose more CSR 
information (see for example Cahaya et al., 2012; Cahaya et al., 2017). The following 
hypothesis is thus proposed: 
H4. There is a positive relationship between international operations and the 
extent of anti-corruption disclosure 
 
3.5 UNGC signatories  
A company’s membership of a particular association or coalition potentially results in 
coercive pressure pressing the company to undertake particular practices. This includes a 
company’s membership of UNGC whose principles include anti-corruption engagement. 
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There are also some requirements to be met when a company wants to be the member. If 
the company does not respond to coercive pressures from the coalition or the association, 
the membership will usually be terminated. Past studies document the significantly 
positive impact of UNGC signatories on anti-corruption disclosure practices 
(Transparency International, 2009; Branco and Matos, 2016). A directional hypothesis is 
thus predicted as follows: 
 
H5. There is a positive relationship between UNGC membership and the extent of 
anti-corruption disclosure 
 
3.6 Control variables  
In addition to the hypothesized independent variables and in line with previous studies 
(e.g. Kent and Zunker, 2013; Blanc et al., 2017; Cahaya and Hervina, 2019), this study 
employs industry type and company size as control variables. This is because these 
variables may influence anti-corruption disclosure practices. Companies operating in 
some industries possibly disclose more anti-corruption information as they deal with asset 
procurement and therefore face a higher corruption risk (Healy and Serafeim, 2016). 
Bigger companies potentially disclose more information because they have greater 
visibility (Hackston and Milne, 1996; Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Blanc et al., 2017). 
 
4. Research methodology 
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In line with most previous anti-corruption disclosure studies (e.g. Healy and Serafeim, 
2016; Blanc et al., 2017; Issa and Alleyne, 2018), this paper uses Transparency 
International’s corruption perception index (CPI) to determine the ASEAN member 
countries to be examined. Based on Transparency International’s 2016 CPI index, four 
countries scored in the middle ranks among ASEAN member nations are chosen to be 
investigated. These selected countries are Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and 
Vietnam, which are ranked 90th, 101st, 101st, and 113th respectively (Transparency 
International, 2016). The main reason for choosing the middle-ranked ASEAN countries 
is that these countries arguably have similar corruption characteristics within the region. 
Similar coervice pressures and environments regarding anti-corruption efforts are 
therefore expected to occur within these nations. 
Consistent with a multiple country anti-corruption disclosure study by 
Barkemeyer et al. (2015), this paper selects companies from the four ASEAN countries 
which adopt Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guideline as the benchmark of their year-
ending 2016 CSR disclosures. This is because GRI guideline is the most widely used 
sustainability guideline in the world and has captured the latest relevant sustainability 
issues based on interviews with various stakeholders across the globe (Epstein and 
Buhovac, 2014; Shabana et al., 2017; Garcia-Sanchez et al., 2016). This guideline is 
therefore considered as the international de facto sustainability disclosure standard (de 
Villiers and Marques, 2016). 
A list of companies operating in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and 
Vietnam and using GRI as the benchmark of their disclosures were obtained from the 
GRI database (http://database.globalreporting.org/search/). Further criteria were then 
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applied to select the final sample companies. These criteria include whether or not a 
company used G4 version, the GRI version which is relevant to 2016 reporting and was 
launched in 2013 (Global Reporting Initiative, 2013), and whether or not a company’s 
annual report, sustainability report, or integrated report in the GRI database was 
presented in English. In the database, it was found that there were 168 companies using 
G4 version for their 2016 reports. Among these 168 companies, there were only 117 
companies presenting their reports in English. The final number of sample companies in 
this study is therefore 117. Data for the anti-corruption disclosure were collected from 
these 117 sample companies’ reports, consisting of 32 annual reports, 79 sustainability 
reports, and 6 integrated reports, for the 2016 financial year. Website disclosures are not 
examined in this study as this study focuses on companies’ disclosures for a particular 
reporting year, which is certainly reflected in annual report, sustainability report, or 
integrated report document. Table I presents the number of sample companies in each 
examined country. 
 
[Take in Table I] 
 
The dependent variable in this study, which is the level of anti-corruption disclosure, is 
measured by using content analysis. This is consistent with most previous CSR disclosure 
studies. Content analysis is “A technique for gathering data that consists of codifying 
qualitative information in anecdotal and literary form, into categories in order to derive 
quantitative scales of varying levels of complexity” (Abbott and Monsen, 1979, p. 504). 
Because a quantitative scale can be derived, the disclosure level can be treated as a 
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continuous variable when it is measured by this approach. To employ this measurement 
approach, a researcher needs to determine a set of rules of ‘what’ and ‘how’ to code, 
measure, and record the documents (Milne and Adler, 1999). A unit of analysis is 
therefore needed for coding, measuring, and recording the disclosures examined in this 
study. 
Previous studies employing content analysis use various units of analysis. These 
encompass length of narrative disclosures, presence of certain themes, number of 
sentences, number of items, number of issues, number of pages, number of lines, and 
number of words (Baker and Naser, 2000; Belal, 2001; Newson and Deegan, 2002; 
Vuontisjärvi, 2006; Maali et al., 2006; Mirfazli, 2008). While there is a debate in the 
literature as to the most appropriate unit of content analysis for measuring the extent of 
disclosure (see Guthrie and Abeysekera, 2006; Amran and Devi, 2008), a study by Smith 
et al. (2005) does not show any statistically different results when different units of 
analysis are used. Accordingly, in line with previous studies done by Gao et al. (2005) 
and Rao and Tilt (2016), this study employs number of words as the unit of analysis. 
Word counting is considered more practical, more controllable, and easily categorized 
(Gao et al., 2005; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). 
In a word counting approach, each sample company’s annual report and 
sustainability report are carefully read to find any information which is dedicated to anti-
corruption themes listed on the disclosure checklist. For the purpose of such a 
measurement, G4 anti-corruption aspect, which consists of three indicators, is adopted as 
the disclosure checklist. To ensure that all anti-corruption issues are captured, the three 
G4 anti-corruption indicators are broken down into eleven subparts. Consistent with the 
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technique used by Rao and Tilt (2016), any information which is dedicated to the three 
G4 anti-corruption indicators and their subparts is pasted to a Microsoft Word document. 
The number of words for each sample company’s disclosure can then be calculated. 
Details of G4 anti-corruption indicators and their subparts used as the disclosure cheklist 
in this study are presented in Appendix.  
The independent and control variables are mostly measured using the 
measurement approaches employed in past studies (Amran and Devi, 2008; Amran and 
Haniffa, 2011; Chiu and Wang, 2015; Branco and Matos, 2016; Cahaya et al., 2017; 
Cahaya and Hervina, 2019). With respect to industry type, this study uses a high-low 
corruption risk categorization based on Transparency International Bribe Payers Index. 
High-risk industries consist of agriculture, light manufacturing, civilian aerospace, 
information technology, banking and finance, forestry, consumer services, 
telecommunication, transportation and storage, arms, defense, and military, and fisheries 
whereas low-risk industries encompass heavy manufacturing, pharmaceutical and 
healthcare, power generation and transmission, mining, oil and gas, real estate, property, 
legal and business services, utilities, and public work contract and construction (Hardoon 
and Heinrich, 2011). The measurement approaches for the independent and control 
variables are presented in Table II. The quantitative data are statistically analyzed using 
descriptive statistics and multiple regression to determine the extent of anti-corruption 
disclosure and the determinants of that extent respectively.  
 
[Take in Table II] 
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5. Statistical results 
The results of the descriptive statistics for the independent and control variables are 
displayed in Table III. A total of 39 percent of sample companies are “privatized” 
government-owned companies whereas the other 61 percent are fully privately-owned 
companies. 73 percent of sample companies rely on major government tenders. A total of 
79 percent of sample companies do have foreign ownerships in their share ownership 
structures. Most of the sample companies (81 percent) operate internationally. In relation 
to UNGC membership, only 8 percent of sample companies do have this membership. 44 
percent of sample companies operate in high corruption risk industries. Finally, the 
descriptive statistics shows that total assets range widely from about 8 million US Dollars 
to around 339,703 million US Dollars with a mean of approximately 13,431 million US 
Dollars. 
 
[Take in Table III] 
 
The descriptive statistics of anti-corruption disclosure for the sample companies across 
the examined four ASEAN member countries is presented in Table IV. It can be seen 
from Table IV that the mean of anti-corruption disclosure level for all 117 sample 
companies is approximately 310 words. The highest dislcosure level is 986 words 
whereas the lowest level is 14 words. Table IV further shows that the highest average 
level of anti-corruption disclosure is in Thailand (about 434 words) while the lowest 
average level of anti-corruption disclosure is in the Philippines (around 149 words). The 
finding regarding the considerable difference between the average levels of anti-
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corruption disclosure in Thailand and the Philippines implies an interesting phenomenon 
that needs to bu further explored. From the perspective of Transparency International 
corruption rating, these two countries have a similar number of corruption cases. This is 
because their corruption ranks are the same, which is 101. In fact, however, there can be a 
different anti-corruption story in these two countries. In Thailand, companies appear to 
have a sronger commitment to combat corruption as evidenced by a number of meetings, 
joint programs, and collective actions agains corruption among Thai companies’ senior 
officers (see Center for International Private Enterprise, 2013). In contrast, in the 
Philippines, companies seem to face a higher corruption risk, particularly when they deal 
with the public services (Business Anti-corruption Portal, 2017). In 2016, about half of 
business executives were asked for a bribe by someone in the Philippine government 
(Business Anti-corruption Portal, 2017). This might explain why Philippine companies 
tend to be silent on anti-corruption actions whereas Thai companies tend to actively 
disclose anti-corruption information.  
 
[Take in Table IV] 
 
Figure I shows the variation of disclosure levels across the three anti-corruption 
disclosure indicators by the 117 sample companies. It can be known from  Figure I that 
communication and training on anti-corruption policies and procedures is the most 
disclosed indicator (11 companies, 94.87 percent). This result indicates that most sample 
companies actively attempt to prevent corruption by communicating their anti-corruption 
procedures and policies to relevant internal and external stakeholders such as employees 
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and business partners2. By communicating such procedures and policies, the relevant 
stakeholders may know various important information such as how to report suspected 
corruption through the companies’ whistleblowing systems and the consequences 
(penalties) of corruption. These stakeholders may then think twice before they do 
corruption and finally do not pursue their intention to corrupt. According to Halter et al. 
(2009), a well communicated anti-corruption policy can be used to reduce the level of 
corruption.   
 
[Take in Figure I] 
 
Confirmed incidents of corruption and actions taken, on the other hand, is the least 
disclosed indicator at 40.17%. There are several possible explanations for this finding. 
Firstly, it involves the whistleblowing procedures. The whistle-blower is subjected to 
high personal risk in certain countries especially where is inadequately legal defence 
against firing, disgrace or at the same time physical violence. The employee or anyone in 
the organization will not whistle if there is a stringent requirement on reporting of 
information, denouncement and vilification laws, and ineffective scrutiny on claims made 
by whistle-blowers (Transparency International, 2018). This possibly hinders the 
reporting of corruption incidence and action plans to be undertaken. Moreover, in most 
cases, frauds were detected internally by the internal audit staff via internal control 
evaluation and review (KPMG, 2013), which is not intended to be reported publicly. 
Secondly, the reporting of corruption incidences is closely related to the 
reputational risk. It appears that companies are very careful in disclosing the sensitive 
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information to the public which is associated with the impression management theory. 
Meaning to say, companies may be bias in choosing the type of information to be used in 
the annual reports (Cho et al., 2010). In relation to this paper, communication and 
training on anti-corruption policies and procedures as the most disclosed indicator implies 
that the companies are highly committed to ensuring that corruptions risks are minimized. 
On the other hand, reporting of corruption incidences, if not appropriately communicated 
may be perceived negatively by shareholders. This is in line with a KPMG survey’s 
finding in 2013, conducted on Malaysian public listed companies that revealed 47% of 
the respondents did not report the corruption incidences to the authority due to fear of 
negative publicity. Thus, the finding reveals that the companies are very careful in 
managing the public impression on the corruption issues in the annual reports. 
Thirdly, there is no full compliance on the United Nation Global Compact 
principles. Due to the small number of companies that join the UNGC membership in this 
paper, there is a lack of awareness among the companies on the need to share the cases 
studies and success stories relating to corruption cases, which can be communicated via 
annual reports.  The sharing of success stories is one of the elements suggested by the UN 
Global Compact when fighting corruption and implementing the 10th principle (UN 
Global Compact, n.d.). Thus, it can be concluded that companies which are members of 
the UN Global Compact are more coerced to disclose the incidence of corruption along 
side with the action plans to be undertaken. 
As explained in the previous section, multiple regression is employed for 
statistically determining the explanatory factors of anti-corruption reporting. 
Accordingly, classical assumptions of multiple regression3, consisting of normality, 
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multicollinearity, homoscedasticity, normality, and outliers (see Hair et al., 1998; Coakes, 
2013; Ghozali, 2018), were checked. Initially, the normality assumption was not met. A 
closer analysis revealed that the residuals were moderately and positively skewed. 
According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), a square root transformation is the most 
suitable transformation method to be used when there is a moderately positive skewness 
in the residual data set. As such, data of all continuous variables in this study were then 
transformed by using a square root transformation. After this transformation, all of the 
assumptions were met. The results of the regression after the transformation are displayed 
in Table V. 
 
[Take in Table V] 
 
As shown in Table V, the regression model is significant as its p-value, 0.027, is smaller 
than 5% significance level.. The value of adjusted R-square is 0.077, suggesting that the 
variation of anti-corruption disclosure can be explained by the predictor variables in the 
model as much as almost 8%. Government dependence and foreign ownership, which are 
hypothesized independent variables, are significant at 5% and 1% significance levels 
respectively. As predicted, the coefficients of these variables are positive. This indicates 
that there are positive associations between anti-corruption disclosure practices and 
government dependence as well as foreign ownership. Hypotheses 2 and 3 are therefore 
accepted.  
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
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The results of this study shows that, on average, companies operating in Indonesia, the 
Phillipines, Thailand, and Vietnam disclose anti-corruption information in approximately 
310 words. The highest average level of this disclosure is in Thailand (around 434 words) 
whereas the lowest average level is in the Philippines (about 149 words). It appears that 
companies in the Philippines are ‘trapped’ in a more corrupt environment (than the 
environment in Thailand) in which there are strong pressure from various stakeholders on 
the companies to corrupt or bribe, particularly when the companies deal with the public 
services. Among the three anti-corruption disclosure indicators, communication and 
training on anti-corruption policies and procedures is the most disclosed indicator while 
confirmed incidents of corruption and actions taken is the least disclosed indicator. 
An important finding of this study is the positive significant impact of dependence 
on government tenders on the extent of anti-corruption disclosure. This finding is 
consistent with Amran and Devi (2008) and Amran and Haniffa (2011). It appears that 
the governments of Indonesia, the Phillipines, Thailand, and Vietnam utilize their 
coercive potentials to push companies to disclose anti-corruption information, 
particularly when those companies’ main revenues are from governments’ projects. In 
oder to survive and gain legitimacy, these companies do their best to respond to the 
coervice pressure by disclosing anti-corruption information. This result suggests that, in 
addition to the existing regulations about anti-corruption engagements, the governments 
may consider all of their business partners as potential fellows to collectively combat 
corruption. Thus, while formal coercive pressures from the governments through 
governance policies, acts, regulations, and their enforcements continue to present (see 
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Joseph et al., 2016), informal coercive pressures trough a tender relationship will 
complement and even strengthen the efforts to reduce the level of corruption. 
Another important finding is the positively significant influence of foreign 
ownership on anti-corruption disclosure practices. This result is in line with disclosure 
studies by Haniffa and Cooke (2005), Khan et al. (2013), and Muttakin and Subramaniam 
(2015), highlighting that the coervice pressure of foreign owners on companies to 
disclose anti-corruption information does exist. In particular, given that most of the 
sample companies do have foreign ownerships within their share ownership structures 
(see the descriptive results in Table III), the existing coercive pressure looks strong, 
causing companies to respond to this pressure. This finding highlights the importance of 
anti-corruption practices from the perspectives of global investors, implying that 
corruption has become a critical global bussiness communities’ concerns (see Lehman 
and Morton, 2017; Issa and Alleyne, 2018). This result also implies that foreign investors 
having shares of companies in  Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam are 
committed to sustainability, including anti-corruption activities. According to Epstein and 
Buhovac (2014), such investors can be classified as social investors.Government 
ownership is not a significant predictor of anti-corruption disclosure. This finding is in 
line with a number of past studies such as Cahaya et al. (2017). The governments of 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam might actively combat corruption but 
they focus more on government officials or civil servants working within the public 
sector agencies. This is because there are a lot of government officials in these countries 
who are involved in corruption and bribery (see Business Anti-corruption Portal, 2017; 
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Salas, 2018). Thus, the governments do not have sufficient time and ‘energy’ to 
coercively push companies to disclose anti-corruption activities.  
An interesting finding of this study is the insignificance of international 
operations given that global business communities currently consider anti-corruption as 
an important aspect companies need to address and disclose (see Lehman and Morton, 
2017; Issa and Alleyne, 2018). This result is consistent with a disclosure study by Hanifa 
and Cahaya (2016). A possible explanation for this insignificant finding is that foreign 
stakeholders do not have ‘face-to-face’ interactions with sample companies’ top 
management so that the top management do not respond to those stakeholders’ coercive 
pressure. The top management may focus more on responding to the coercive pressures 
from their foreign owners who have a clearly legal power to push companies to undertake 
particular practices, including anti-corruption disclosure practices, through their share 
ownerships.   
UNGC membership is not a significant determinant of anti-corruption reporting. 
This is consistent with Barkemeyer, Preuss, and Lee (2015). This insignificant finding 
might be explained by the descritpive statistics figure showing that only 8% of the sample 
companies are members of UNGC (see again Table III). Thee eight percent companies, 
seven companies are based in Thailand, one company is a based in the Philippines, and 
one  themselves are dominated by Thai companies. Only two companies are based 
outside Thailad, which are Land Bank of the Philippines (the Philippine) and XL Axiata 
(Indonesia). This implies that coercive pressure does exist but is not strong enough to 
press companies in the four ASEAN member countries to disclose anti-corruption 
information.    
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None of the control variables is significant. The result regarding industry type is 
in line with a disclosure study by Cahaya and Hervina (2019) and the finding in relation 
to company size is consistent with Blanc et al. (2017). While the high-low corruption risk 
industry categorization may reflect the potential presence of corruption within a specific 
industry, it is not associated with the quantity of anti-corruption disclosures. Bigger and 
smaller companies also disclose similar quantities of anti-corruption disclosures. High 
corruption risk companies and big companies may attempt not to ‘talk’ too much about 
their anti-corruption efforts due to the fact that they have problems with corruption. Low 
corruption risk companies and small companies, on the other hand, appear to be confident 
enough to disclose anti-corruption actions since they may have a smaller number of 
corruption incidents. These may result in similar levels of anti-corruption disclosures 
across different companies’ industry types and across different company sizes. 
Overall, it can be concluded that the variability of anti-corruption disclosure 
practices in Indonesia, the Phillipines, Thailand, and Vietnam is influenced by two 
coervice variables namely government dependence and foreign ownership in a positive 
direction. Anti-corruption reporting practices in these four ASEAN member countries are 
therefore partially explained by coervice isomorhism, a specific subset of institutional 
theory.  
This study provides several implications. Firstly, the implication is relating to the 
pattern of anti-corruption plan adopted by each country. Quah (2009) evaluates three 
patterns of corruption control that have different features: 1) Anti-corruption laws without 
an anti-corruption agency; 2) Multiple anti-corruption agencies, and 3) Single anti-
corruption agency. In relation to this paper, the Philippines (the lowest discloser) has 
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been identified as having the second type of corruption control, which is multiple anti-
corruption agencies.  Meanwhile, Thailand (the highest discloser) has been identified as 
having the third pattern of corruption control, which is single anti-corruption agency. 
According to Quah (2009), the large number of anti-corruption agencies in the 
Philippines was due to the numerous changes in political leadership as those agencies 
were either created or abolished by the President. Among the agencies set up from 1950s 
to 2000s under different Presidents were Presidential Commission on Good Government, 
Presidential Committee on Public Ethics and Accountability, and Presidential Anti-Graft 
Commission. The changes of these agencies occured because of rising complaints from 
the public, complaining about the agencies’ incompetence and resource shortages (e.g. 
manpower shortage and fund shortage). As stated by  Quah (2009),  these anti-corruption 
agencies’ efforts to reduce corruption are deemed unsuccessful due to improper 
implementation of anti-corruption laws, rules and regulations, reflecting lack of coercive 
pressure.  
In Thailand, the sole independent agency which is given an authority to combat 
corruption is the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) (formerly named the 
National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC)) (National Anti-Corruption 
Commission, 2014). NACC is responsible not to the Prime Minister but to the Senate. 
NACC has a full authority on management aspects, including staffing and budgeting. The 
members of NACC are nominated by the Senate and appointed by the King for a term of 
nine years. NACC has three functions, which are: 1) inspecting and verifying the 
declaration of the assets and liabilities submitted by the politicians and civil servants; 2) 
preventing corruption, and 3) taking disciplinary actions against corrupt politicians and 
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civil servants (Quah, 2009). It appears that NACC has a strong coercive power to execute 
activities on combating corruption. 
According to Quah (2009), the third pattern of corruption control (single anti-
corruption agency) is more effective than the second pattern of corruption control 
(multiple anti-corruption agencies). This is because a single anti-corruption agency  is 
associated with the political will or commitment of their governments in curbing 
corruption.  Using political will, a government makes law to authorize the anti-corruption 
agency to exercise the anti-corruption regulations objectively, indicating the coercive 
pressure. Simultaneously, in spite of this, the anti-corruption agency must be independent 
from political controls to allow allegations of corruption against political leaders and 
senior civil servants. The agency’s sole effort on curbing corruption is an incredible gain 
as it is not disturbed by other urgencies. Thus, it is suggested from this paper that each 
ASEAN member country needs to focus on corruption prevention by implementing a 
single agency.   
Secondly. other ASEAN member countries should refer to Singapore as a role 
model in combating corruption although this counrty is not examined in this study. This 
is because Singaporean citizens are better informed and educated in the government’s 
anti-corruption strategy implementation (see Libres, 2016).  In this manner, the people 
are very sensitive to corruption activities in both the public and private sectors. In 
Singapore, all laws and policies pertaining to anti-corruption are implemented 
completely. According to Khidhir (2019), Singapore maintains a high score among 180 
countries in the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) released recently by 
Transparency International. In fact, strong enforcement efforts are only part of the 
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Singaporean government’s comprehensive and effective anti-corruption strategies. 
Singapore's reputation as a visible venue to conduct businesses is strengthened by a high-
level of its legislative framework, including corporate liability. The Corrupt Practices 
Investigation Bureau (CPIB), a Singaporean government agency which has the mandate 
to investigate into any acts of corruption in Singapore, has an extensive investigative 
power and has been widely perceived as independent and successful in achieving high 
conviction rates for corruption offences (Burke et. al., 2017). 
The third implication of this study is related to the instilling culture of integrity by 
top management in organizations. As suggested by the ASEAN CSR Network (2017), 
there are several ways that can be implemented by top management to combat corruption 
in organizations. These include: 1) integrating anti-corruption values in the 
management’s communications, decisions and actions, 2) identifying corruption risks 
which is embedded in companies’ policies, 3) committing to anti-corruption policies 
regardless of the outcome of the implementation, 4) providing rewards and training for 
staff, and 5) making a strong whistleblowing policy.  
Getting organizational culture right is essential for preventing and resisting 
corruption (IBAC, 2019). The culture must be first set by top management and followed 
by all members throughout the organization. Managers set up and inculcate the culture 
within their teams and organizations. At the same time, they have the chance to set the 
tone and standard from the outset.  This will enable employees to understand their roles 
and responsibilities, and experience the sense of belonging in the organization. In 
developing a good culture, a robust integrated governance is required – a combination of 
policies and procedures and a true leadership. Specifically, a middle management has a 
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particularly important role to play by bridging the gap between policymakers and 
employees working at the operational level.  Processes and governance can be planned 
and managed once the identification of financial, reputational or technological risks have 
been identified. The governance should be a used as a foundation of anti-corruption and 
integrity culture. Therefore, staff as the human capital must be regularly trained to 
internalize the culture. At the same time, the polices and procedures must be updated and 
regularly reviewed from time to time (IBAC, 2019). 
Fourthly, the implication of this study gives an impression that Thailand is trying 
very hard to improve its reputational risk and manage stakeholders’ impressions. In short, 
both the private and public sectors in Thailand have been keen to improve compliance 
practices in enhancing the international community's view on Thailand's transparency 
levels and ensuring that investors will be better protected from the risk of bribery. This is 
due to the use of strong internal control measures by multinational companies operating 
in Thailand. The use of internal control measures by many multinational companies has 
been driven by other international regulations such as the US Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, the UK Bribery Act and other similar anti-corruption laws of the jurisdictions in 
which they may operate (Tungsuwan, 2017). Definitely, this practice influences other 
Thai companies to implement appropriate internal controls measures 
Finally, the findings of this study suggest that there should be a strong 
collaboration among anti-corruption agencies in the ASEAN member countries. In spite 
of the existence of several anti-corruption initiatives, partnerships and exchanges within 
the region, challenges still exist as a result of the emerging corruption risks stemming 
from the increased regional integration in AEC. In addition to the establishment of AEC, 
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strategic action plans and formal agreements are needed to further combat corruption in 
the region. Thus, more initiatives could be pushed among ASEAN leaders to put 
transparency and anti-corruption activities in their inter-regional ministerial agenda, 
enabling the promotion of greater transparency and the fight against corruption. This 
definitely could help ASEAN countries to attain smoother and more sustainable levels of 
political, economic, and socio-cultural integration. All anti-corruption agencies in this 
region can exchange ideas and information as well as learn from one another’s best 
practises and experiences in fighting corruption. 
There are several far-reaching consequences potentially experienced by ASEAN 
countries if corruption remains unresolved. Few ASEAN countries have faced acute 
deprivation for years and years, with millions of citizens leaving the countries to earn 
better livings in other countries (Satar, 2015). Such a condition reflects inequality in 
income. Inequality in income will continue to increase due to an improper regional 
economic integration which only benefits a few well-connected elites. Corruption is 
pricey and causes a great loss to a nation in terms of economic growth, trade, foreign 
investments, and the country’s competitiveness which, in turn, results in overloading the 
government’s expenditure, along with distorting the market mechanism and causing 
resource misallocations. Moreover, the corruption is the main stumbling block for a 
country to achieve sustainable development goals (SDGs). Curbing corruption including 
money laundering is very important for ASEAN to achieve its growth target and establish 
a sound investment environment as well as financial stability within the region. 
As with all research, there are limitations associated with this study. Firstly, not 
all companies operating in Indonesia, the Phillipines, Thailand, and Vietnam found in the 
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GRI database are examined . This is because some companies listed on the GRI database 
did not present their reports in English. Such a language barrier might prevent some 
important insights from being captured in this study. Secondly, there might be some 
subjectivity while doing the content analysis. According to the Writing Center of 
Colorado State University (2007), a conceptual content analysis can be considered to 
establish the "existence and frequency of concepts” in a text. This is most often 
represented by words or phrases. In this study, the word count relating to sample 
companies’ corruption risk assessment is the example. However, "as a research method, 
content analysis is inherently subjective and presents a number of practical challenges" 
such as difficulties in selecting recording units, coding of repetitive message and 
subjective judgements (Steenkamp and Northcott, 2007, p. 20). To minimize subjectivity 
in this study, data were independently verified by two coders who have experiences in 
CSR reporting research. 
Future multiple country anti-corruption disclosure studies should be undertaken 
by research teams whose members are the natives of the examined countries. Thus, 
language will not be a barrier if the examined reports are not presented in English. Future 
studies may also need to extend this research by constructing a more updated disclosure 
checklist based on other international guidelines relating to anti-corruption. At the same 
time, the validity of the disclosure instrument could be further improved by examining a 
few samples from ASEAN companies’ annual reports to capture ‘real disclosure’ by the 
firms. Validation from practitioners and experienced scholars may also add credibility to 
the disclosure checklist. 
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Appendix: G4 anti-corruption indicators and their subparts  
GRI code Indicator No Subpart 
G4-SO3 Total number and percentage of 
operations assessed for risks 
related to corruption and the 
significant risks identified 
1 Report the total number and percentage of operations 
assessed for risks related to corruption. 
2 Report the significant risks related to corruption 
identified through the risk assessment. 
G4-SO4 Communication and training on 
anti-corruption policies and 
procedures 
3 Report the total number and percentage of governance 
body members that the organization’s anticorruption 
policies and procedures have been communicated to, 
broken down by region. 
4 Report the total number and percentage of employees 
that the organization’s anti-corruption policies and 
procedures have been communicated to, broken down 
by employee category and region. 
5 Report the total number and percentage of business 
partners that the organization’s anti-corruption 
policies and procedures have been communicated to, 
broken down by type of business partner and region. 
6 Report the total number and percentage of governance 
body members that have received training on 
anticorruption, 
broken down by region. 
7 Report the total number and percentage of employees 
that have received training on anti-corruption, 
broken down by employee category and region. 
G4-SO5 Confirmed incidents of 
corruption and actions taken 
8 Report the total number and nature of confirmed 
incidents of corruption. 
9 Report the total number of confirmed incidents in 
which employees were dismissed or disciplined for 
corruption. 
10 Report the total number of confirmed incidents when 
contracts with business partners were terminated or 
not renewed due to violations related to corruption. 
11 Report public legal cases regarding corruption 
brought against the organization or its employees 
during 
the reporting period and the outcomes of such cases. 




Table I: Sample employed for analysis 
Country    Number Percentage 
Indonesia    41 35 
The Philippines    13 11 
Thailand    55 47 
Vietnam    8 7 
Total    117 100 
Source: Original table 
 
Table II: Measurement technique of the independent and control variables 














Measurement Type of data 
Government ownership 
 
 1 = there is a proportion of government ownership  





 1 = there is a major government project, tender, 
privatization project, or concession 
0 = otherwise 
 
Categorical 
Foreign ownership  1 = there is a proportion of foreign ownership 
0 = otherwise 
 
Categorical 
International operations  1 =Yes-Have material foreign sales or a  
      foreign subsidiary or a foreign branch  
      office 
0 = No material foreign sales, foreign subsidiaries  
      or foreign branch offices 
 
Categorical 
UNGC membership  1 = the company is a member of UNGC 
0 = otherwise 
 
Categorical 
 Industry type 1 = high corruption risk industry 
0 = low corruption risk industry 
Categorical 
    





Table III: Descriptive statistics of the independent and control variables 
Panel A: Categorical variables    
Variable     Percentage 
Government ownership      
Government ownership is present 39 
Government ownership is not present 61 
Government dependence      
Government dependence is present 73 
Government dependence is not present 27 
Foreign ownership      
Foreign ownership is present 79 
Foreign ownership is not present 21 
International operations      
The company operates internationally 81 
The company operates nationally 19 
UNGC membership      
The company is a member of UNGC 8 
The company is not a member of UNGC 92 
Industry type      
High corruption risk industry 44 
Low corruption risk industry 56 
Panel B: Continuous variable   
Variable  Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
deviation 
Company size (in US Dollar)
a
  8,148,876 339,703,433,400 13,430,757,166 36,574,681,814 
Note: a While company size is measured by log of total assets, the descriptive statistics of this variable is 
presented in the form of total assets in this table. The purpose of such a presentation is to best provide the 
data characteristic of the sample company sizes. 
Source: Original table 
 
Table IV: Descriptive statistics of anti-corruption disclosure 





(number of words) of all 117 
sample companies 
 14 986 310.38 209.81 
      
Anti-corruption disclosure of 
Indonesian sample companies 
(number of words) 
 21 607 219.34 138.27 
      
Anti-corruption disclosure of 
Philippine sample companies 
(number of words) 
 14 347 149.08 111.15 
      
Anti-corruption disclosure of 
Thai sample companies  
(number of words) 
 30 986 434.05 209.89 
      
Anti-corruption disclosure of 
Vietnamese sample companies 
(number of words) 
 30 532 188.88 159.04 










(Constant)          8.746    0.000 
Government ownership +         0.091    0.941 
Government dependence +         3.458    0.016** 
Foreign ownership +         3.768    0.009*** 
International operations +         2.181     0.140 
UNGC membership +         1.145    0.599 
Industry type (control variable) +         0.137    0.903 
Company size (control variable) +         0.004284    0.520 
Model summary 
Adjusted R-Square                                           0.077 
Standard error of the estimate    5.93833 
Regression model (sig.)    0.027** 
***significant at 1% level; **significant at 5 % level 
Source: Original table 
 
Figure 1: Disclosure of anti-corruption 
 
 






























































1 UNGC is a coalition initiated by the United Nations was launched in 2000. The coalition has grown to about 2,900 
signatory companies and 3,800 members in total. The coalition has ten principles that are focus on human right, 
labor, environment, and also anti-corruption (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2008). 
2 In the context of this study, relevant stakeholders are those who potentially corrupt or those who potentially  give 
opportunities to corrupt or to do other financial misconducts such as bribery. An amployee, for instance, is an 
internal stakeholder who potentially corrupts by illegally taking the company’s money. A busines partner is an 
external stakeholder who may bribe some internal key people (or the other way around) so that a business conract 
can be extended.   
3 For brevity, the detailed results of the classical assumption tests are not presented in this paper.   
